conversation seems endless. Imagine two lovers quarreling. Finally, Jack says to Jill, "this is the end; I don't want to talk to you anymore!" Then, they go on talking. A friend might conjecture that Jackwanted to goon talking; that he did not want to end this relationship. Reading The End of Modernity, I come away feeling that Vattimo wishes to continue his affair with modernity.
I take Vattimo's case as symptomatic. Like him, some postmodern critics invest heavily in anti-metaphysics. Perhaps philosophers should. That issue I will leave to philosophers and here address only the question of the value of Vattimo's The End of Modernity for a postmodern cultural criticism. My view is that this work goes in a direction troublesome for a cultural criticwho wishes to address the experiences of his or her constituency-persons uyingto survive a postmodern world. For me the experience of the end of modernity is the body crying out, forging its own rhetoric. It is an experience of pain seeking words. It is not a cognitive experience entailing the destructuration of the discourses of European philosophy since Plato. An anti-metaphysics is inescapably conceptual. Hence, it prolongs the death watch. There seems to be no end. The wake is indeed a wake. The mourners keep the mourned vital if not alive. By recalling over and over the life of the allegedly deceased, however critically, they revivify him in themselves.
In these remarks, I take Gianni Vattimo's The End ofModernity as a point of departure for asking the question-can a postmodern praxis be derived from a modern logos? Specifically, what do Vattimo's terms contribute to understanding an experience as painful as the end of modernity, the end of a way of life? I have become increasingly convinced that dethroning metaphysics in its own terms is merely to celebrate at its wake, thus endlessly postponing the funeral.
For instance,when Vattimo visited Miami University in the spring of 1990, my colleagues, responding to his book, raised questions in his own "anti" -metaphysical terms. On the one hand, this is a customary protocol. On the other, as investments in repairing its structure through restructuration, as negations of its concepts, as ways of recuperating its logos, thevery terms of the book preclude the end of modernity. I do not suggest that more telling questions could have been asked of him in some sort of meta -terminology. There is no such terminology. But often systematic uses of terms preclude questions from "outside" the system and thereby alternatives to it. Antimetaphysics is metaphysics in reverse. You travel the same road when you turn about and go in the opposite direction.
Ordinarily, in reading texts made from a specific fabric of beliefs, critics have a choice to make. They can empathetically "dwell within" the pattern as defined or "break out" of the spell of those boundaries.1 They does not have access tosome other language or system that offers a higher perspective; rather she has "faith" or "doubt." If readers have faith in a credo, then they make every effort to understand its terms and accept them on faith as insightful and heuristic. On the other hand, readers can doubt the value of the credo and distrust the insights its texts offer. They do not, thereby, assume a higher or better vantage point offered by an alternative system of beliefs. Their credo (like a television that's not cable-ready) becomes less efficacious and they start to desire an alternative. Beliefs wear out, become outdated, lack the wherewithal to decode contemporary experiences.
Credos are like intellectual software. They are useful at one historical moment and then give way to other programs. To go from one conceptual software to another requires an act of faith. There are reasons to do so. But it is not that WordPerfect 5.1 has a meta-critical relation to Wordstar 2.0. Only that which you can do with one, you can't do with the other. It may seem infelicitous or crude to speak about metaphysics as an outdated conceptual software, but it is hardly unusual to speak of concepts as tools, that is, as "wares" for our work. For me, it is a question of the work they can assist us in accomplishing. When persons use a given belief to govern their conduct, desires are either satisfied or unsatisfied. Essentialism is not a problem because it is a conceptual error, a flaw in our thought processes. As a way of thinking, it is outmoded. It doesn't do the job for the desires that invoked its resources. Essences are poor tools for a post-modern world. In a world governed by Rorschach tests ("when I hold up this image and say thisword, tell what you feel" says the ad exec to us like a spider to a fly), concepts blur experience. They are "infinitely interpretable."
Vattimo's work seems at first glance to give us ways of coping with a post-modern world by exploring the inadequacies of modern conceptions of our experiences. The dilemma of the end of modernity is that the world has changed in a radical way that calls for a new way of "being in the world," he remonstrates. But the issue is whether we should or shouldn't change our conceptions of experience, and it is difficult to see how a discussion of the inadequacy of our conceptions of artistic and scientific understanding at the highest level of philosophical generality can incisively address problems of conduct when they are so remote from it. You might ask, why narrow the problem of a rapidly changing world to the issue of conduct. Consider the changes that are taking place according to commercialization, reification, simulacrization (26) . We live in a world that wages wars and elects presidents through electronic media campaigns. We live in a world dominated by access to electronic technologies. We live in an increasingly electronic environment. Consider our future. We live in a world that is ecologically unsound and which seems more and more likely to choke off our existence (pun intended). I claim that our survival does not depend upon concepts but upon the ability of intellectuals to motivate their constituencies to change the world by changing their conduct in it. My skepticism about thinkers like Vattimo is that their constituencies are only a tiny group of like-minded intellectuals who speak the same language. The problem with Vattimo's terms is that they are too metaphysical despite his disclaimers (not only outrageously abstract, arcane, involuted) to affect any other constituency than the readers of Western European philosophy. To continue to address the question of the end of modernity in the language of "anti-metaphysics" is to think at an historical standstill. Metaphysics concerns the most general level of thought possible: the concept of 'Being' is the exemplary instance of such generality. The meaning of the inaugurability of the work of art can be granted greater or lesser importance according towhether one thinks of poetry in the same way as one thinks of the Bible, the great national epics, or the ground-breaking works of our civilization (the Greek tragedians, Dante, Shakespeare, HOlderlin, and so on), or whether one tries instead to test the definition even on 'minor' works of art-in which case this inaugurability might be understood above all as the originality or as the irreducibility of the work to whatever has already been" (67).
Aside from wondering why Shakespeare is "groundbreaking" (and nowomen are) and even if I knewwhat ground was broken, making an experience into an abstract abstraction (inaugurability) is a trait of modernism. Postmodern persons (people who are alive) who retain this modern trait may have difficulties coping with their world.
The End of Modernity is a provocative book. On the one hand, it confirms my sense that we are living in a postmodern era. On the other, I do not experience the "end of modernity" in quite the way it isproposed in this volume, nor in the way this book is addressed by my colleagues. As a work of philosophy, the book appropriately deals with "the end of modernity" as a concept. At the same time, given the conceptual link between "post-history" and "the end of modernity," this concept has to be understood as the interpretation of an experience, albeit an experience of a rather small group of people. It is at the level of self-experience that I find myself resisting Vattimo's analysis. The experience Vattimo presupposesis more of an intertextual linking of his thought with other postmodern thinkers (which also characterizes the manner in which it is addressed) than it is an account of an experience anyone is likely to have. One then wonders, since we are in "post-history," if the concept is relevant to anyone other than a reader of the thinkers it links?
When Vattimo thinks about the end of modernity, he reflects on the meaning of a concept and its conceptual history. He wants to "see" the postmodern "as an experience of the end of history" (4). But, he perceives his conceptions-"the" post-modern as a "way of being aware" of post-history (4-5). He perceives Nietzsche; he perceives Heidegger, he perceives Gehlen's post-history-"the condition in which progress becomes routine" (7). He sees this as a "speaking together" in which an awareness that the new is no longer perceived as the new is mentioned. This experience is one of not "feeling oneself as a moment that has been conditioned and sustained by a unitary process of events"-"an experience that is possible only for modern man" (10) . Rather, the post-modern experience is feeling that "everything tends to flatten out at the level of contemporaneity and simultaneity" (10). Oddly, he applauds the "valid" founding of such "observations" on "empirical data" (12) because he does not wish to reduce such experiences to "'subjective' emotions and feelings" (12). This is a thinker thinking about how people might feel if they re-ad what he read.
For Vattimo, the experience of the end of modernity is the experience after which nihilism as a mode of thought beyond metaphysics is "our only chance" (20) . (179) Vattimo's delineation gives us the surface of the experience of secularization or commercialization in the sense that it takes the experience to be an entirely conscious one. The experience of postmoderniry hinges upon an experience of "the infinite interpretability of reality"-"the endless labour of interpretation of every aspect of existence" (rd), upon "profound revision and transformation" (179) of our notions. He claims it is "a new experience" which is not catastrophic. Indeed not. An experience of the infinite interpretabilityof reality is, in many respects, the opposite of a crisis. Interpretations are marketable (though not in all cases profitable). A "historical" crisis is a crisis only to the extent that it is threatening. The loss of ultimate values (Gods, Truths, Beauties) threatens the self. Infinite interpretability does not. Moreover, interpretations, much less explanations, are not, experientially, infinite; they are as finite as the persons who interpret or explain.
The question "why" is so disconcerting because it can be asked over and over again. Finally, as Wittgenstein observed, one runs out of answers. This seems to me to be the crucial moment, a moment that can only be reached by trying to answer the question "why." This moment of "having no answers," of having been driven to exasperated silence, reveals commitment. When parents reach this crux as a consequence of the innocent persistence of their children's questions and say, "Because I said so," they reveal themselves in their selfinterest. This moment reveals interests. It is a moment in which one experiences the absence of reasons and the appearance of one's irrationality. It produces unreasonable responses. To ward off the moment, persons sometimes offer rationalizations that seem to forestall the advent of having none. Using the language of anti-metaphysics to offer an ironic counter-thesis to Vattimo's, I can say that my experience of the end of modernity is one of "irrationability," of having run short of reasons. The end of modernity, for me, is an experience of a crisis in belief. I 
